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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
AS TO FACTS
Respondent

is

dissatisfied

both

with

Appellant's

failure to cite facts in the record which support the lower
Court's ruling and with his argument's references to matters not
sustained by the record.

Accordingly, Respondent makes this

statement of facts relevant to the issues presented for review
which issues center

in Appellant's claim that he should have

been awarded one-half of the "equity interest" in the Sheridan
Road residential real property*
The Sheridan Road property claim was the subject of
the following colloquy with the trial court at the outset of
Appellant's examination of Respondent regarding that property:
MR. PAXTON: Your Honor, I understood from what
was reported to me by Mr. Fankhauser, as a result of the
pretrial conference with this Courtf that the issue of who
owned this property [Sheridan Road] or whether these two
people involved in this casef the plaintiff and the
defendant, indeed have any right, title or any equitable
interest in it, vis-a-vis its titled owner, Mr. Cap Persch,
was not an issue in this proceeding.
MR. FANKHAUSER: That's true.
Still, the Court
can determine if there is an equity interest and then the
Court can deal with it, is that what you're talking about?
MR. PAXTON: The Court is not here to determine
if in fact any equity interest exists in favor of this
plaintiff and this defendant, vis-a-vis, the titled
property owner.
THE COURT: I don't understand that statement,
Mr. Paxton. If these people have a claim in some property,
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this Court as between these people can determine what their
respective interest may be. As to somebody else, I make no
determination, right?
*

*

*

MR. PAXTON: On that basis then, I understand
that we're not here to quiet any title or grant any award
against any other persons?
THE COURT: I can't.
MR. PAXTON: Exactly.
Exactly, but I think the
Court can determine, based upon any evidence, what the
character of any asserted claim may be, whether it's joint
marital property or pro-parties (sic) [partakes] of any
separate property character or whatever, is that correct
then? Do I understand the Court?
THE COORT: As between these parties, the only
determination I will be able to make is whether or not one
has any preferential rights over the other if it is marital
estate.
(R. 228-30).
The record facts relevant to the issues presented, including the
issue framed by the trial court, are:
Wendy and Terry Hermansen resided in a home at 2315
Sheridan Road, Salt Lake City, Utah, from January 1978 until
their
Record

separation
on Appeal

in June 1984. (Findings of Fact 1M[6 and 11,
pagination

number

113, hereinafter

"R.")

Wendy's parents, C. A. and Sharon Persch, were record owners of
that property throughout the time of the parties' occupancy and
at the time of trial. (R. 257, 259)

Prior to their move to

Sheridan Road the parties had resided in a house on McClelland
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Avenue

in Salt Lake City which Terry had owned before they

married in June 1977. (R. 182, 226)

At about the time they

moved into Sheridan Road they had a discussion at the home with
Wendy's father which

resulted in their signing a document he

drew, Defendant's Exhibit 7. (R. 254)

Mr. Persch characterized

Exhibit D-7 as an "offer to sell the property which involved a
gift if it was performed." (R. 274, 276)

Terry understood that

the purchase offer had been made by Wendy's parents pursuant to
their plan to gift $30,000 for tax purposes to each of their
children

toward

a home.

(R. 250, 253, 255-56)

Mr. Persch

testified that he discussed his intent to gift to his daughter
and grandchildren at the time Exhibit D-7 was signed and said:
"I wanted to see that my children and grandchildren were living
in the best conditions possible.

If I could help in any way, I

was going to make all desire to make that happen.

I did want to

gift them as much money as I possibly could." (R. 260-62)
Part

of

the

gift

was

reflected

in the

difference

between Exhibit D-7's recited

$58,000 purchase price and the

property's

at that

fair market

value

testified was $70-75,000. (R. 261)

time which

Mr. Persch

He based that valuation, in

part, upon an earlier bank loan appraisal he had obtained. (R.
276-77)
Sheridan

Terry
Road

testified

property

that

was made

another

gift

related

to the

by Mr. and Mrs. Persch on

Christmas Day 1978 by their delivery to Wendy and him of Exhibit
D-8,

a

signed

card

acknowledging
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reduction

of

their

note

indebtedness by four $3,000 gift amounts totalling $12,000. (R.
250;

Ex.

D-8)

When

they

had

"moved

in originally"

Terry

understood that gifts were going to be made in this form each
year

until

they

couldn't

(R. 250,

255-56)

Terry

Sheridan

Road

in 1978

give

any

more

characterized

as follows:

for
their

tax

purposes.

occupancy

of

"We were living there,

maintaining the place and paying the bills." (R. 252)
Whether the parties made the down payment called for
by Exhibit D-7 was disputed:

Terry claimed to have performed

roofing labor for Mr. Persch and Wendy's brother in exchange for
that payment
made.

(R. 286-87); Wendy testified no down payment was

(R. 339)

Persch's

Nevertheless,

testimony

that Wendy

Terry

did

not

and he had not

controvert

Mr.

performed

the

contract in that they had failed to assume the Valley Bank loan
and that Terry told him he did not want to buy the house, that
he did not have the money and he couldn't afford it and did not
want to refinance it. (R. 274, 278)
had no ownership

Wendy's belief that they

interest

in the Sheridan Road property was

based on similar reasons:

No down payment or yearly payments

had been made, and when her father discussed the refinancing of
the Valley Bank mortgage Terry told her "he didn't want to do
it, to make a higher monthly payment" because he couldn't afford
it. (R. 339, 341)

The purchase offer required that the mortgage

loan be assumed, not just that the monthly loan payments be
made, in order that Mr. Persch "could get off the line" for the
loan. (R. 274)
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During the time the parties occupied the Sheridan Road
home they paid the monthly $328 mortgage loan payments to Valley
Bank.

Those payments came from two sources:

$258/mo. from

their current earnings, and $70/mo. from proceeds Wendy received
from property she owned before the marriage. (R. 230-31, 240,
2429 246f 272)
becausef

as

They also paid the property taxes and insurance
Wendy

testified/

"The

rent

would

have

substantially higher if we didn't do that." (R. 232)

been

Howeverf

the year before their separation/ 1983, and again in 1984 they
failed to pay the property taxes. (R. 219-20)
Terry

testified

that when they moved

into Sheridan

Road the yard was overgrown with a lot of garbage in the garage
and

in

the

back

which

relandscaped. (R. 155-56)

he

cleaned

parties

away

and

"Living room was in fairly

That was about it."

completed

hauled

His description of the interior and

exterior condition of the home was:
good condition.

upf

numerous

(R. 156)

remodeling

performing most of the labor.

projects

In 1982 the
with

Terry

Terry testified the cost of the

remodeling materials was "close to $25-30/000" and was paid by
billing them to Mr. Persch's company/
Center

("P.D.C.").

(R.291-94)

Terry

Furniture Distribution
offered

no

evidence

regarding either the increase in Sheridan Road's market valuef
if any/ attributable to that remodeling or the value of his
labor.
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It

was

through

F.D.C.

and

an

affiliated

Utah

corporation. Desk & Chairs, Inc.f which had been organized and
funded by Mr. Persch and F.D.C. for Terry's sole ownership and
operation,

that

he

realized

his income which

$25,000 in 1980 to $34,400 in 1983. (Ex. 1-P)

increased

from

Wendy worked in

the Desk & Chairs business as well earning $4,000 in 1983 (Ex.
P-l)

At the time of trial Desk & Chairs was defunct but she

continued to be employed at F.D.C. (R. 185, 271)

The $4,600

vested pension plan funds awarded to Terry (Memorandum Decision
1fll, R. 99) were the sole remnant of that defunct corporation.
Terry acknowledged that it was either from F.D.C. via
company trades, non-cash bonuses or paycheck deductions or from
Mr. and Mrs. Persch via gifts that the parties obtained the
furniture
marriage

and
which

personal
are

property

identified

items

in his

acquired
Exhibit

during

D-9.

the

(R. 292,

328-336)
Considering all this Mr. Persch testified "We've given
them countless thousands." (R. 262)
The parties brought certain items of personal property
into the marriage.

Those which remained at the time of trial

were acknowledged to remain the property of each. (Findings of
Fact 1(14, R. 114; Decree of Divorce 1[11, R. 124)
Terry sold his McClelland property during the marriage
realizing $12,000. (R. 311)

$4,000 of that sum was used as the

down payment to purchase the 1979 Dodge Ramcharger awarded to
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Wendy. (R. 311)
balance

of

Mr. and Mrs. Persch had paid off the $1/200

the

(R. 240, 319)

original

lien

against

the vehicle

in 1981.

Howeverf the parties later took out another loan

against it to pay family debts the unpaid balance of which was
$1/700. when they separated.

By the time of trial Wendy had

paid that loan balance down to $862. (R. 218-19/ 240)
witness

called

by Wendy

testified

that

in his opinion

Ramcharger's market value was $2/000. (R. 146)
testimony

of

(R. 305-306)

the

value

of

the

truck

An expert

was

the

Terry's opinion
not

received.

The court found its value to be as the expert

testified. (Findings of Fact H13f R. 113)
McClelland proceeds were also used to pay Sheridan
Road property taxes (R. 311), and for Terry's $3f000 share in a
ten-acre real property investment with Mr. Persch and Wendy's
brother called the "Bitner" property. (R. 322-23/ 325)

Wendy

testified she understood the Bitner investment was a family deal
which included her brother's wife and her. (R. 338)

Neither

party offered any valuation evidence for the Bitner property.
(R. 200/ 321-22)
Terry's Exhibit D-9 contains valuation figures for the
Sheridan Road

($110/000) and Bitner

($20/000) properties/ as

well as a Bitner indebtedness ($2r667) , which are used in his
brief as the foundation for his analysis and argument that the
Court's property distribution is inequitable. (Appellant's Brief
pp. 9/ 11 and 13)

However/ Exhibit D-9 was received solely for
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the purpose of "...what he would claim to be his feelings as to
distribution"
contains.

(R. 301) and not as evidence of the matters it

None of those figures is property argued to the Court

for these reasonss

Upon counsel's timely objection the Court

ordered Terry's testimony
estimate stricken

regarding

that Sheridan Road value

(R. 301); the only evidence related to the

Bitner property's value was its $18,500 acquisition price but
the purchase date was not established (R. 325); andf the Bitner
indebtedness

figure was

taken

from

Mr. Persch's

unpublished

deposition. (Appellant's Brief p. 9)
With the single exception of the claimed Sheridan Road
"gross equity" which

Terry

proposed

be divided

equally, the

Court distributed all of the properties before it in exactly the
manner

suggested

Property

in

Settlement"

his

Exhibit

(Memorandum

D-9,

"Defendant's

Decision

116-11r

Proposed
R.99) .

Similarly/ the Court ordered the parties to pay and discharge
their obligations/ including the liens on the vehicles awarded
to

eachf

in

the

manner

proposed

"Schedule of Debts and Obligations"

in

Terry's

Exhibit

D-10,

(Memorandum Decision 112,

R. 100) .

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Respondent submits that Appellant's failure to request
the

trial

court

to

amend

its

findings

to

correct

the

insufficiencies which he argues as the basis for the relief he
seeks here constitutes a waiver of those claims.
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Respondent also submits that the trial court's failure
to find that any interest in the Sheridan Road property or the
interest

acquired

by Appellant

in the Bitner

property

were

marital estate is supported by the evidence and that its award
of "any and all" interests in those properties to each party,
respectively,
it

is

is in harmony with this Court's rulings in which

acknowledged

that

restoration

of

separate

property

contributions to parties in divorce actions is proper.
Respondent submits that Appellant's claim of error as
a result of the trial court's failure to establish a valuation
for the Sheridan Road property is without merit where the court
did not first find that the property was marital estate andf
therefore, subject to distribution.

Lastly, Respondent argues

that the Court's division of the property items it found to be
subject to distribution cannot be shown to be so inequitable as
to be the result of an abuse of discretion.

ARGUMENT
I.

APPELLANT'S CLAIM HAS
BEEN WAIVED

Appellant cites Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1772 (Utah
1985) , as

authority

for

the

relief

he

seeks.

Respondent

suggests that the Jones decision cuts against him.
In Jones this Court ruled that the appellant-wife's
contention

that

the

case

should

-9-

be

remanded

for

entry

of

findings as to property values in order that the equitability of
the decreed property distribution could be assessed had been
waived for the reason that her counsel had made no motion to the
trial court to amend its findings to include specific property
values.
At the trial of this action the Court stated that its
consideration of evidence relevant to Terry's claim that the
parties owned an "equity interest" in the Sheridan Road property
would be for the purpose of determining whether either party had
preferential rights over the other if such claim was found to be
marital estate. (R. 230)
The trial court did not find that any such claim was
marital estate. (Findings of Fact 1(11 and Conclusions of Law 1f7,
R. 113, 116), and Appellant's post-trial motion for a new trial
or

amendment

of

judgment

did

not

request

that

additional findings be made in that regard.
now

claims

this

results in error

is an

insufficiency

Brief p. 5, para. 1 and p. 10, para. 2)

new or

Nevertheless, he

in the

in the Court's property

any

findings

award.

which

(Appellant's

The trial court had

correctly indicated to counsel that a finding that any claimed
interest in the Sheridan Road property was marital estate would
have

to be made before

it could consider what

rights in that property should be.

the parties'

In the absence of such a

finding the trial court's award of any such interest to Wendy is
entitled

the

presumption
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that

it

is

correct

and

supported by the evidence and Terry's failure to request the
trial court to make an express finding on that issue precludes
him from claiming that insufficiency as error now.

The Jones

"waiver" holding is directly on point.
Neither did Appellant's post-trial motion specifically
request the Court to open the judgment and take further evidence
in order to value the Sheridan Road property.

Rather, it merely

challenged the Court's ruling on the admissibility of Terry's
valuation testimony (R. 301) and objected to the Court's refusal
to award him what he wanted on the Sheridan Road property as an
abuse of discretion.
And

last,

in his

post-trial

motion

Terry

did not

request the Court to make a finding as to whether the Bitner
property

interest

awarded

to

him was marital

estate

or to

establish its valuation for the purpose of assessing the merit
of

his

motion.

Because

the

equitability

of

a

property

distribution order can only be weighed by viewing all of its
provisions as a wholef Appellant's failure to request the lower
court to correct all parts of its order susceptible to the same
objections which he now

raises in connection with only some

parts should preclude him from obtaining the Court's review of
that order.
Accordingly, this Court should rule that Appellant has
waived any claim to the relief he seeks.
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II.

THE TRIAL COURT"S FAILURE TO FIND
ANY CLAIM IN THE SHERIDAN ROAD
PROPERTY TO BE MARITAL ESTATE IS
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.

Appellant premises his arguments to this Court on the
assumptions that the parties had an "equitable interest" in the
Sheridan

Road

property

estate.

Howeverf

and

that

this

interest

was

marital

the trial court made no findings regarding

either of those assumptions which is supported by the evidence.
The first point to be made is that the parties had no
interest whatever in the Sheridan Road property.

According to

the testimony of Mr. Persch the parties failed to perform the
terms of Exhibit D-7 which he described as an offer to purchase
"involving a gift if it was performed." (R. 274, 276)
position

the parties

ever

occupied

under

Exhibit

The best

D-7 was a

chance to own the property if they complied with its terms.
Terry did not controvert

Mr. Persch's testimony that he had

refused to assume the Valley Bank loan when his father-in-law
requested him to do so saying that didn't want to buy the house
because he couldn't afford it. (R. 274, 278)

The trial judge

could choose to believe Mr. Persch—which he apparently did—and
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this Court should not substitute its view of the evidence for
that

of

the

fact

credibility.
interest

finder who alone

demeanor and

The court's failure to find any marital-estate

in the the Sheridan

substantial

can assess

record

evidence

Road property

and

is supported by

its conclusions

should notf

therefore, be disturbed.
Assuming, however, that the Court found some interest
in the Sheridan

Road property

had been acquired

during

the

marriage it was, nevertheless, proper under the evidence for the
Court to not find that interest to be marital estate and to set
any such interest over to Wendy.
The case of Larrabee v. Larrabee, 504 P.2d 358 (Colo.
Ct. Ap. 1972) is persuasive authority for this position.

In

Larrabee the wife had been gifted three parcels of property:
one by her grandfather prior to the marriage and two by her
mother during the marriage.

The mother's gifts were made to the

wife, her brother and their spouses.
reduce

the

mother's

considerations.
executed

The notes
divided

were

motivated

by

tax

promissory

notes

payable

in

yearly

As each installment came due it was forgiven.

remained

the

and

Upon delivery of the deeds the grantees had

secured

installments.

estate

The gifts were made to

unpaid

parties'

at the time of trial.

personal

properties

between

The court
them

and

awarded "all of their interests in the real property" to the
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wife*

Upon the husband's appeal of that real property award the

court found and held:
In
determining
the
proper
division of property in a divorce
action
many
factors
must
be
considered^ including how the property
was acquired, the financial situation
of the parties, their participation in
enhancing and preserving its value,
and all other pertinent circumstances,
[citations omitted]
The husband was
on active duty as a petty officer in
the navy during the five year duration
of the marriage. The court found that
his participation, if any, in the
management of the land given to the
wife
prior
to the marriage
was
adequately compensated by the income
received therefrom. The court further
found that the gift from the wife's
mother was intended primarily as a
gift to her own children and that the
husband was not entitled to retain any
interest in the land. Under the '
circumstances of this case, the award
of the property to the wife, based on
these findings was not an abuse of
discretion.
504 P.2d at 359-60.
Also close on point is the case cited in the Larrabee
opinion, Cohan v. Cohan, 474 P.2d 792 (Colo. 1970).

The wife's

principal contention on appeal was that the Court had erred in
finding that money given to her by the husband's parents was a
gift

to

him

rather

than

to her.

Before

the marriage

the

husband's father had drawn two checks payable to her for $6,000
and

$5,000

specifying

that

the proceeds were

toward a house for the parties.
them

back

to

her

husband

and
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to be applied

She endorsed the checks, gave
the proceeds were

applied

in

acquiring a home*

The husband's father testified that he made

the checks payable to her on his accountant's advice for gift
tax purposes.
to

the

same

In its attempt to restore the wife substantially
asset

position

she

had

occupied

prior

to the

marriage the Court found
[T]hat this was a gift by the
defendant's parents to the defendant
and
that
the plaintiff
was not
entitled to any portion of the $11,000
in
the property
division.
The
testimony was in conflictf but there
was ample evidence to support the
finding of the trial court as to the
intent with respect to the gifts, and
we should not and will not disturb
that finding.
474 P.2d at 793.
The

facts

of

our

case

are

analogous

to

those of

Larrabee and Cohan.
There was substantial evidence before the trial court
which could support a finding that Wendy's parents intended to
gift the Sheridan Road property
grandchildren.

to their daughter and their

Property coming from a spouse's family in this

way could properly be viewed as separate in character.
trial

court's award to Terry of all

interest

The

in the Bitner

property can be justified by a similar view of the credible
evidencef namelyf

recognition of the separate character of an

asset acquired during the marriage with his pre-marital funds.
As to Terry's

claim

of joint contributions to the

Sheridan Road propertyf his payment of property taxes out of his
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McClelland

sales

proceeds

would

have

$5,400 for the years 1978 to 1983
$900;

Ex.

P-l)

which

was

less

totalled

approximately

(average taxes per/year =

than Wendy's

$70 per

month

contribution from her pre-marital funds to each house payment
during the six and one-half years they lived there (84 mos. x
$70 = $5f880).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable

to the Court's findings, the balance of each monthly payment
they made, $258, could be seen as no more than the use value of
the property given Wendy's testimony that they would have been
required to pay more rent than that if they had not also paid
the property taxes and insurance*

(R. 232)

have

for

performed

labor

in exchange

disputed (R. 286-87 and 339)

the

Terry's claim to
down

payment

was

It was not disputed, however, that

the materials that went into the 1982 remodeling were paid for
by Mr. Persch's company. (R. 291-94)
As

shown

by

the

following

summary

of

evidence

supporting the Court's ruling, Wendy's personal and family-gift
contributions to the acquisition and use of the Sheridan Road
property outweighed Terry's by an approximate 8:1 margin:
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TERRY

WENDY
$17,000 Persch family gift on
acquisition

$3f000 labor down payment
(disputed)

12,000 additional Persch family
gift
5,880 contributions to house
payments, pre-marital
funds

5,400 property taxes paid
pre-marital funds

( ? )

( ? ) labor on property

labor on property

30,000 remodeling materials
paid by Persch business
$8,400

$64,880
The foregoing

facts adequately

failure to find any interest

support

the Court's

in Sheridan Road to be marital

estate.
Indeed,

the

Court's

award

of

all

Bitner

interest to Terry and any Sheridan Road property

property

interest to

Wendy is supportable under the evidence as a recognition of the
separate-property character of the fund (Terry's McClelland sale
proceeds) or

source

acquisition possible.

(Wendy's

family

gifts)

which

made

each

As such the Court's property award is in

harmony with this Court's rulings in cases such as Preston v.
Preston, 646 P.2d 705 (Utah 1982) and Jesperson v. Jesperson,
610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980).
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III.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO
VALUE THE SHERIDAN ROAD PROPERTY
WAS NOT ERROR.

In Larrabeef supra, the appellant-husband also argued
that the court had abused its discretion by awarding the real
property to the wife without first determining its value.

The

court rejected that argument stating:
[Blefore value becomes important the
court must first determine whether the
property is subject to division.
504 p.2d at 360.
This Court's ruling in Jackman v. Jackman 696 P.2d
1191 (Utah 1985) is similar.

In that case a husband was found

to have no interest in businesses that the appellant-wife had
attempted to prove he owned when the suit was initiated.

The

Court's exclusion from the property distribution of the value of
his alleged interests in those business entities and the Court's
award to her of any interest he "has or may have had" in those
entities was held not to be an abuse of discretion.
In this case the court below did not find that any
interest or equity the parties may have acquired in the Sheridan
Road

property

Accordingly,

was marital
its

failure

estate
to

subject

establish

property was not an abuse of discretion.
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to

distribution.

a valuation

for

that

IV.

THE COURT'S PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION
IS EQUITABLE.

There is no fixed rule or formula for distribution of
a marital

estate and the standard applied

reviewing such awards is straightforward:
either

the

result

of

a misapplication

by this Court in

Was the distribution
of law or was it so

inequitable as to indicate a clear abuse of discretion.

Turner

v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6 (Utah 1982).
The trial court did not find that the parties had
acquired
property.

any

marital-estate

interest

in

the

Sheridan

Road

The Bitner property interest was found to have been

obtained by Terry and Wendy's brother. (Findings of Fact 1(12f
R. 113)

As for those properties the Court specifically found

were acquired during the marriage by the parties' it established
dollar valuations. (Findings of Fact 1113, R. 113)

Its division

of those properties, summarized belowf although resulting in a
dollar-value

split

favoring

Terry

cannot

be

said

to

be

inequitable. *
TO TERRY
1981 Ford pickup
Furniture, etc.
Desk & Chairs
vested pension
funds

TO WENDY
$ -02,170
4,600

1979 Ramcharger
Furniture, etc.

$6,770

$1,132
4,615

$5,747

*
(Values:
Findings of Fact H13, R. 113; Exhibit
Schedule of Furniture and Personal Property.)
Terry's final argument
having

unfairly

lost

that he leaves the marriage

his pre-marital
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D-9,

separate

property

(the

McClelland

sales

proceeds)

is

also

without

merit

when

the

evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the Court's
findings and ruling:
more

than

the $5,400 he spent for property taxes was

matched

by

Wendy's

$5,800

separate

property

contribution to the monthly house payments; his $3,000 Bitner
investment remains intact; and his $4,000 contribution to the
acquisition of the Ramcharger would have been offset by Wendy's
parents' payment of the $1,200 purchase money lien balance and
her discharge of the subsequent lien against that vehicle which
secured a loan used to pay family debts.

CONCLUSION
Substantial record evidence exists which supports the
trial

court's

demonstrated

findings

that

the

misapplication of law.

and

order.

property

award

Appellant
was

the

has

result

not
of

a

Neither has he shown that the Court's

distribution of the properties before it works such a manifest
inequity

as

to

indicate

a

clear

abuse

of

discretion.

Accordingly, the order of the trial court should be affirmed.
^ — — - ,

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this
day^bf December 1985

A...GARY L. PAXTOff
Clyde & Pratt
Attorneys for Respondent
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